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This paper is the first to explicitly test for the presence of a trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency in a regulated industry, the electricity industry. We show for 16 European countries over the 
period 1998-2007 that higher electricity end-user prices in a country subsequently lead to higher 
investments in the capital stock, i.e. in generation, distribution and transmission assets. Moreover, 
there is a trade-off between vertical economies and competition. Ownership unbundling and forced 
access to the incumbent transmission grid increase competition but come at the cost of lost vertical 
economies. Generally, we find that regulation that affect only the market like the establishment of a 
wholesale market or free choice of suppliers increase investment activity via spurring competition. 
Regulation, however, that adversely affects the incumbent directly, like ownership unbundling, 
decreases aggregate investment spending. 
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The Sector Inquiry published on January 2007 highlighted a lack of competition in European 
energy markets, and although legal and functional unbundling are accepted in their positive 
impact, it was concluded that these regulatory reforms are not sufficient to contribute to 
certain energy political goals. In this context, further steps of unbundling such as ownership 
unbundling, a deep ISO (independent system operator) or an ITO (independent transmission 
operator) are seen as appropriate to stimulate competition, trigger investments, and assess the 
evolution towards an integrated European energy market. Hence, the European Commission 
passed a third legislative package in September 2007. In its centre lies the vertical unbundling 
of transmission companies and long-distance transport in the electricity as well as the gas 
sector. However, up to now, no unambiguous evidence of positive effects of unbundling on 
prices or market concentration exists, as mentioned in, for example Florio (2007), nor is there 
evidence on its effects on investment incentives in energy markets, beside Nardi (2010).
 Theory not only indicates that the unambiguously positive view of ownership 
unbundling by the European Commission is not warranted, there are much wider, inherent 
trade-offs between static and dynamic efficiency, and between vertical synergies and 
competition. Higher mark-up industries are likely to attract more new investments than low 
mark-up industries, provided there is a sufficiently high level of competition. Thus, higher 
prices - while inducing allocative and static inefficiencies - increase the attractiveness to 
invest and therefore dynamic efficiency.1 Likewise, there is a well established literature on the 
benefits of vertical integration, ranging from the avoidance of double marginalization to the 
internalization of spillovers and better coordination, to name only a few. Forced access or 
break up of companies - while guaranteeing equal treatment of firms – are not for free and 
come at the costs of coordination failures and other diseconomies of vertical disintegration.2 
 This paper tries to fill the lack of evidence on the effects of regulation on investments. 
We are the first to explicitly test for the effects of ownership unbundling of the transmission 
grid as well as final consumer prices on investments, and corroborate the inherent trade-offs 
present in large sunk cost network industries. We estimate dynamic panel regression models 
for the electricity industry in 16 European countries over the period 1998-2007, and find that 
ownership unbundling reduces investments in the electricity industry. We also estimate an 
investment reducing effect of third party access to the electricity transmission grid. Moreover, 
                                                 
1
 This is, of course, a variation of the trade-offs analyzed in the patent literature, see e.g. Nordhaus (1969). 
2
 In a recent survey, Meyer (2010) outlines the main effects of (ownership) unbundling on efficiency. Depending 
on the unbundling scenario (generation; distribution and retail; transmission; and distribution unbundling), 
coordination failures and market risk effects lead to efficiency losses of up to 17% for the broken-up companies. 
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there is a general trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Higher electricity end-user 
prices induce higher investments in the sector. We also find that introducing competition via 
market based measures – such as establishing a wholesale market for electricity or abolishing 
minimum consumption thresholds for switching to alternative suppliers – increases 
investment spending. These measures increase competition and investment spending without 
unduly destroying the incentives of the incumbent to invest. 
 Methodologically, we care mostly about two problems. First, there are inherent 
endogeneity problems of investment determinants. “Regulation” may well be determined by 
investments, the same may be true by “prices”. Therefore, we do not only apply consistent 
estimation techniques such as GMM but explicitly test for Granger causal relationships 
among the main variables of interest, and accordingly estimate instrumented regressions. 
Second, a general problem is that it is hardly possible to disentangle the effects of the 
coincident timing of different types of regulation. Pollitt (2008) e.g. says: “…ownership 
unbundling of transmission networks may occur at the same time as privatisation, the 
restructuring of generation or production markets, the introduction of incentive regulation etc.” 
We try to disentangle these potentially coincident relations by utilizing the time series 
variation of the main variables of interest in our panel, and lag them up to two years in our 
regressions. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short literature 
overview over the existing theoretical models and empirical evidence on unbundling. Section 
3 develops our main hypotheses. Section 4 describes our data set, section 5 presents the main 
results, and section 6 contains robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Survey 
Several theoretical articles analyze the impact of ownership unbundling3 on consumer prices 
and investments. Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) show that ownership unbundling leads to a 
more effective regulation. They, however, highlight that it causes the problem of double 
marginalization, which implies price increases in the long run. Overall, they find that the 
negative effects of double marginalization outweigh the positive effects in such a way that 
legal unbundling becomes preferred to ownership unbundling. Cremer et al. (2006) also show 
that ownership unbundling is more detrimental to social welfare than legal unbundling. They 
                                                 
3
 Ownership unbundling requires the system operator of the networks to be fully unbundled from the rest of the 
former integrated system, which means that ownership and control of the power lines have to be fully separated. 
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ascribe this effect to the higher incentives for investments under legal unbundling, since under 
this regime other parts of the company can still benefit from investments done from the 
formerly vertical integrated company, which is not the case under ownership unbundling. In a 
similar approach, Höffler and Kranz (2011) confirm the previous findings and show that the 
desirable properties of legal unbundling with special regard to social welfare and investment 
incentives can only be achieved if there is a strong, effective and independent regulation. For 
a comprehensive survey on the effects of unbundling in the electricity sector, see Meyer 
(2010). He concludes that there are significant vertical synergies that are lost particularly if 
generation unbundling is introduced (separation of generation from the two network stages 
transmission and distribution). According to Meyer (2010), the ISO option, where ownership 
remains unchanged, while operating and investment decisions are handed over to a company 
without commercial supply interests, would be the “golden mean“. 
In contrast, Pollitt (2008) criticizes Bolle and Breitmoser (2006), and Cremer et al. 
(2006) because of their underlying assumptions. He reports that reverse results can be 
expected if more realistic assumptions are incorporated. For the former study he states that 
their model should take into account anti-competitive information advantages of legal 
unbundling for the rest of the integrated firm, while the latter does not consider the 
competition enhancing effect of ownership unbundling as well as the fact that double 
marginalization assumes one-part tariffs, which is usually not the case for the electricity 
sector. Brunekreeft (2008), and Brunekreeft and Meyer (2008) analyze the possible effects of 
different types of unbundling in electricity markets on competition and cost evolution by 
means of a cost-benefit analysis. They deduce that ownership unbundling may not directly 
lead to expansion investments, but if capacity becomes scarce, it may support investment 
decisions if the considered time period covers about 20 years. 
 Up to now no unambiguous empirical evidence of positive effects of ownership 
unbundling on prices or market concentration exists, as mentioned in, for example Florio 
(2007), nor is there evidence on its effects on investment incentives in energy markets, beside 
Nardi (2010). Nevertheless, several studies cover the impact of different types of regulation or 
liberalization. Steiner (2001) is one of the first articles covering the effects of liberalization on 
consumer prices. She analyzes data from 19 OECD countries spanning a time period from 
1986 to 1996. She finds that unbundling of generation and transmission facilities leads to 
increasing efficiency for the overall sector, however, the possible benefits are not necessarily 
shifted to private consumers via lower prices. No distinction between accounting separation 
and legal- or ownership unbundling is made. 
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Hattori and Tsutsui (2004), opposite to Steiner (2001), find that unbundling appears to 
increase prices. However, an explicit distinction of the different types of unbundling is again 
not made. Copenhagen Economics (2005) deals with the level of market opening in several 
network industries by means of a dynamic panel data model. They focus on the EU-15 
countries from 1993 to 2003 and conclude that higher levels of unbundling (with ownership 
unbundling as the highest form) lead to price reductions and increasing efficiency.  Moreover, 
they conclude that unbundling of the transmission grid is the most important element of 
market opening. However, for the gas sector they cannot confirm this negative effect of 
unbundling on prices.  
More recently, Fiorio and Florio (2009) show for the electricity industry that vertical 
integration leads to higher final consumer prices, and using a standard probit model, they 
conclude that consumers are less satisfied if firms are integrated. In line with earlier studies, 
their results for the gas industry differ substantially. Herein, prices and vertical integration are 
uncorrelated, and consumers are more satisfied with higher levels of integration. Similar 
studies dealing exclusively with the gas industry are Brau et al. (2010) and Growitsch and 
Stronzik (2009). The latter paper explicitly accounts for ownership unbundling, but the 
authors do not find a significant effect of ownership unbundling on prices.  
Most of the previously mentioned articles focus on the impact of unbundling on prices 
or efficiency, but neglect the effects on investments. The most important empirical study in 
this context is by Alesina et al. (2005), who analyze different regulatory reform processes in 
seven network industries in 21 OECD countries covering the time period 1975 to 1998. The 
authors show that regulatory reform of product markets has a positive effect on investments. 
Analyzing the gas and electricity sector jointly, they come to the conclusion that investments 
increase according to stricter levels of unbundling. However, they do not differentiate 
between ownership and legal unbundling. 
Nardi (2010) undermines these findings. He analyzes the impact of ownership 
unbundling on grid investments and quality. Although he finds higher grid investments in the 
network, he further shows that a substantial lack of quality emerges that confirms the resulting 
diseconomies of coordination when separating ownership and control of different company 
parts. According to the author his results should be seen as first findings, since only 
qualitative investment data is available and therefore no multivariate regression analysis can 
take place. Nevertheless, to our knowledge this is the only paper that explicitly analyzes the 
impact of ownership unbundling on (grid) investments, in spite of the difficult data situation. 
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3. Hypotheses on the determinants of investments 
There is a general ambiguity of the effects of competition on investments, and since 
regulation intrinsically affects the competitive process, there is an ambiguous relation 
between regulation and investments. In what follows, we detail the likely effects of three 
categories of investment determinants, (1) investment opportunities and competitive effects as 
measured by prices in the market; (2) regulation, and (3) ownership structure. 
3.1. The effects of prices on investments 
Ceteris paribus, a higher price implies better investment opportunities and therefore larger 
investments, since rents are higher from expanding the capital stock in a high mark-up 
industry than in a low mark-up industry. This effect can be called “Schumpeterian”, and it is 
the underlying force in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type of models of competition and 
innovation. One of the novelties of this paper lies in the explicit introduction of a measure for 
“investment opportunities” in the investment model. Thus, we are able to explicitly show the 
trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. 
However, there are at least two objections to this “naive” line of reasoning. First, a 
larger mark-up does not need to only capture the efficiency of the firm and thus its investment 
opportunities, it could also capture its monopoly rents. If so, the effects of larger prices on 
investment incentives depend in an intricate way on the threat of losing these rents, i.e. on the 
firm relevant counterfactual of not investing. When there is no danger of losing existing rents, 
so that the firm is essentially an uncontested monopoly, the counterfactual of not investing is 
the status quo, i.e. no other firm can compete existing rents away. This gives rise to the Arrow 
(1962) “replacement effect”, implying a low propensity to invest in new products or 
processes. Larger prices then are just an indication of a low threat of entry, and the monopoly 
should invest very little, since new profits from investments just replace old profits. 
If there is a reasonably high threat that the counterfactual of not investing is that 
another firm will invest and capture the accruing rents, the Aghion et al. (2005) “escape 
competition” effect should lead to a positive relation between mark-ups and investments. 
Larger mark-ups imply more to loose from not investing if there is competition for these 
rents. Note, that although the direction of effects is the same compared to the situation when 
prices measure investment opportunities, the interpretation slightly differs. If prices only 
measure investment opportunities, the firm will invest more – independent of the competitive 
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situation. If prices measure rents, the firm will invest more only when there is a reasonably 
high threat to loose these rents if not investing. 
Second, high prices and investments may be endogenous. Investments, at least the 
depreciation part of it, are – when accepted by the regulator – part of the regulatory base, and 
thus increase energy prices by definition if regulation is “cost plus”. Moreover, investments 
determine prices, if the competitive position of the firm is altered by this investments (reverse 
causality). We econometrically tackle these problems of causality below. 
3.2. The effects of (access) regulation on investments 
Regulation and in particular access regulation should increase the ease with which firms can 
enter the market and compete with the incumbent. Logically, regulation can be decomposed 
into (1) regulation affecting only the market directly (e.g. the existence respective non-
existence of a liberalized wholesale market or of a minimum consumption threshold of 
consumer switching their supplier) and (2) regulation affecting also the incumbent directly 
(e.g. third party access or whether the incumbent is only legally unbundled or ownership 
unbundled). 
Again, the effects of regulation on investments are ex ante ambiguous and may differ 
between incumbents and entrants. Stricter (access) regulation reduces the incentives of the 
incumbent to invest, since (i) it lowers the Net Present Value (NPV) of incumbent’s 
investments because cost based access reduces rents (Valletti (2003) or Pindyck (2007)); (ii) it 
shifts risk from entrants to incumbents because entrants enjoy a risk-free option to lease 
infrastructure and exploit the regulatory arbitrage between wholesale and retail prices when 
demand uncertainty is resolved., and (iii) it increases overall risk of the incumbent and 
therefore its cost of capital, see Jorde et al. (2000). In addition, (iv) ownership unbundling of 
the activities of the incumbent on different stages of the production process (e.g. generation 
and grids) can have detrimental effects. There are several reasons for that. First, double 
marginalization problems are introduced by ownership unbundling, which decrease the 
overall rents that can be earned in this market and therefore investments. Second, spillovers 
and network externalities between up- and downstream operations can no longer be 
internalized by the same firm. Third, a coordination failure between infrastructure investments 
and generation assets may result if the decision making entities differ. Finally, a separated 
grid operator is a much smaller firm than the vertically integrated incumbent, and due to size 
and financial resources effects may invest less. 
8 
 
 The positive effects of (access) regulation on investments are: (1) A vertically 
integrated incumbent may not raise retail competitor’s costs if the competitor is more 
efficient, see for instance Rey and Tirole (2007), and Sibley and Weismann (1998). Moreover, 
Foros (2004) and Kotakorpi (2006) show that service-based competition, if it increases variety 
and innovation and, concomitantly, demand, might encourage investments by incumbents. An 
example for the electricity sector is the introduction of smart grids, where substantial 
investments have to be made in the up-coming years. (2) The so-called “investment ladder” 
theory Cave and Vogelsang (2003); Cave (2006) implies that low access fees enable entrants 
to build up an installed base and learn about demand and cost conditions and they will 
eventually roll out their own networks. (3) Finally, access regulation can precipitate a “race” 
to provide infrastructure increasing investments by incumbents and entrants Valletti (2003).  
In addition to these positive effects of market access regulation, regulating the 
incumbent directly may further spur competition in the market and thus investments. In case 
of ownerhsip unbundling, it reduces the scope for discrimination against entrants, since the 
newly created grid operator – like a two sided-market platform – has an incentive to spur 
competition upstream (e.g. generation) and downstream (e.g. retail) and treat all firms equally. 
This increases investments by entrants, but could also increase investments by incumbents 
depending on where on the inverted U-shape the industry is positioned. 
3.3. The effects of ownership structure on investments 
The ownership structure in the electricity sector may affect investments in two ways, first via 
efficiency and second via incentive or objective effects. Unambiguously, more efficient firms 
should invest more, either because they serve a larger market including also low willingness-
to-pay-consumers (demand effect) or they obtain a larger market share (competitive effect). If 
public ownership implies X-inefficiency, therefore, we should see less investments in 
predominantly state-controlled energy sectors. On the other hand, the state and state-
controlled firms may have objectives or incentives that differ from privately-controlled firms, 
and these objectives may include the build up of a good and secure infrastructure for 
electricity. Since budget constraints of state-controlled may be softer than for privately-




Table 1 presents an overview and definitions of the variables used in the subsequent 
regression analysis.4 Investments, I, are gross investments in tangible goods in the overall 
electricity industry, and thus include investments in generation, distribution and transmission 
assets. Capital stock data is not readily available, thus we use the perpetual inventory method, 
see e.g. Fazzari et al. (1987) and Salinger and Summers (1983). Capital stock, K, is calculated 
according to the formula:       	, where  is the capital stock in period t,  
is the depreciation rate and 	 equals investments. Due to the long-term nature of investments 
in the electricity sector we assume a depreciation rate of five percent, see e.g. Alesina et al. 
(2005). We exclude the first three years of every country-panel to arrive at the first  used in 
the regressions.5 
The variables of main interest are final consumer prices, P, the four regulatory 
variables, ownership unbundling, OU, third party access to the transmission grid, TPA, 
liberalized wholesale market, LWM, minimum consumption threshold, MCT, and the public 
ownership variable, PO. Electricity end-user prices for households are purchasing power 
parity and taxes corrected, and are measured in USD per kWh. The regulatory variables are 
coded such, that larger values indicate more stringent regulation. Thus, we code OU as 1 if 
there is ownership unbundling of the transmission grid, and 0 if there is no OU. OU is based 
on several publications of the EU Commission, namely different benchmarking reports and 
various reports on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market. If there has 
been any misleading or conflicting evidence, the corresponding national authority has been 
contacted. TPA is 2, if there is a regulated TPA, 1 if third party access is negotiated, and TPA 
= 0, if there is no TPA. The existence or non-existence of a liberalized wholesale market for 
electricity is coded as 1 = LWM, and 0 = no LWM. If MCT = 5, there is no minimum 
consumption threshold for consumers to be allowed to choose their electricity supplier, and if 
MCT = 0 consumers have no choice of the supplier. MCT takes on values in between 
depending on the amount of electricity that must be consumed annually. Thus, MCT = 4, if 
there exists a threshold but this threshold is smaller than 250 gigawatts (GW), MCT = 3, if 
consumption must be between 250 and 500 GW, MCT = 2, if consumption must be between 
500 and 1000 GW, MCT = 1, if annual consumption must be more than 1000 GW. Finally, we 
                                                 
4
 Our sample is an unbalanced panel which contains data for 16 European countries over the period 1998-2007. 
5
 We also tried four and five years, but since results are very similar we only report the results on leaving out the 
first three years of investment. This also holds true for the special case of Spain, where there was very little 
investments in the first three years (1995-97) of our sample, possibly due to the starting regulatory reform 
process from 1997 onwards. 
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measure the ownership structure of the largest companies in the generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply segments of the electricity industry by PO, taking on the value 0, if 
firms are private, 1 if they are mostly private, 2 if they are mixed, 3 if they are mostly public, 
and 4 if they are public.  
Table 2 presents evidence on investments and prices as well as on the regulatory 
variables and public ownership. Table 2a shows that average investment rates vary between 
4% (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Slovak Republic) and 30% for Spain. The average 
I/K is 8.8%. Electricity is cheapest in Norway and Sweden (average of 5 USD cents per kWh) 
and most expensive in Portugal (20 cents). The average kWh costs around 12.5 cents. 
For our reporting period five countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and 
Hungary) do not have ownership unbundling at all, although of course there is legal 
unbundling in all countries (see Table 2b). At the other extreme, Finland and Sweden were the 
first to ownership-unbundle the transmission grid from generation. Finally, there is a group of 
countries switching from legal unbundling to ownership unbundling during our sample period 
(Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, and the 
UK. Most countries introduced regulated third party access in the years 1999 or 2000, only 
Hungary (2002) and Germany (2006) came later (Sweden, Finland and the UK introduced 
regulated third party access already in 1995/96). With the exceptions of Belgium, Poland and 
the Slovak Republic, all countries either had already a liberalized wholesale market before the 
start of our sample period or introduced it during the sample period. Minimum consumption 
thresholds for freely choosing one’s electricity supplier were either phased out during the 
sample period or were already abolished before 1998 in all countries. Rather diverse 
ownership structures can be observed across countries. While Germany, the UK and Belgium 
have either private or mostly private electricity sectors, the state still plays a major role in the 
other countries. 
5. Econometric modeling 
 The most important determinant of investments should be the expected future 
profitability of investments. This would accompany the fundamental forward looking nature 
of investments: without capital market failures the firm should maximize its present value, 
given a set of capitalization rates of expected future returns and given a set of initial 
conditions (e.g. the existing stock of capital). If the firm maximizes the discounted flow of 
profits over an infinite horizon absent delivery lags, adjustment costs, and vintage effects, 
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capital depreciates at a geometric rate and assuming a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production function with σ the constant elasticity of substitution between capital and variable 
inputs, the relationship between the desired (optimal) capital stock K*, the level of output Y, 
and the cost of capital c can be written as 
*
t t tK c Y
σα −=
         (1) 
where c is a function of the purchase price of new capital relative to the price of output, see 
Chirinko (1993) and Caballero et al. (1995). Taking logs of (1) and denoting logarithms with 
lower case letters, we get 
k a c yt t t
*
= − +σ
        (2) 
In the absence of adjustment costs, kt* would be the optimal capital stock for a profit 
maximizing firm with a constant returns to scale CES production function. Adjustment 
processes may be complex, and one simple way to arrive at a tractable model and account for 
adjustment costs is to nest (2) within an autoregressive-distributed lag model, for example an 
autoregressive-distributed lag ADL (1,1) model of the form 
k k y y c c ut t t t t t t= + + + − − +− − −α α β β ϕ ϕ0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1      (3) 
Further assuming that the change in the capital stock can be described by a simple 
partial adjustment process of the form 
∆k k kt t t t= − +−θ ε( )* 1        (4) 
where some constant fraction θ  of the gap between the actual and the desired levels of 
the capital stock is closed in each period, we get the error correction specification as 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
1 2 1 0 1 2
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) [ (1 )]
t t t t t t
t t t
k k y y c c
k y
θα θ α θβ θ β β θϕ θϕ
θ θα θ β β θα ψ
− − −
− −
∆ = − − ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ − −
− − + − − +
 (5) 
Assuming that the variation in the user cost of capital can be controlled for by 
including additive year-specific effects (λ t ), the real interest rate r, country-specific effects (
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iη ), that electricity prices p inversely capture c, and finally using the approximation that 
∆k I Kt it i t i≈ −−/ , 1 δ ,6 we get the dynamic investment equation 
, 1
0 1 , 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 1
, 1 , 2
i tit
i t it i t t t t t t t
i t i t
it
II p p y y k y r r
K K
regulation ownership
η λ ρ υ υ θ θ ν ν τ τ
ψ
−
− − − − −
− −
= + + + + + ∆ + ∆ + + + + +
+ + +
  (6) 
where we further include our variables measuring regulation and ownership structure, and 
with ψ θ ε α εt t t tu= + − −1 1. In the econometric estimation we lag all predermined explanatory 
variables by an additional period to reduce endogeneity problems. If adjustment costs to the 
desired capital stock are important in the electricity sector, we expect a positive and 
significant ρ . 1θ and 2θ  measure accelerator effects, 0ν and 1ν  error correction, i.e. a 
negative 0ν or a positive 1ν
 
imply more future investments in case of the capital stock being 
below the desired level. Positive 0υ and 1υ  imply a preponderance of positive effects of 
higher relative output prices. The effects of regulation and ownership structure on investments 
are ambiguous, and depend on the trade-off between vertical synergies and competition, and 
the amount of X-inefficiency versus the objectives of the state. We measure y  by energy 
consumption. 
6. Regression Results 
Table 3a presents our main regression results, while Table 3b calculates short and long-run 
effects for the dynamic panel equations. The table compares country fixed effects estimates 
with GMM, the latter consistently estimating a dynamic panel.7 This is done for a model 
specification with and without the error correction terms. The GMM model estimates the 
regression augmenting it by a lagged dependent variable using the difference GMM estimator. 
This estimator eliminates country fixed effects by first-differencing as well as controls for 
possible endogeneity of current explanatory variables. Endogenous variables lagged two or 
more periods will be valid instruments provided that there is no second-order autocorrelation 
in the first-differenced idiosyncratic error terms.8 The Sargan test does not suggest rejection 
                                                 
6
 iδ is subsumed into the unobserved country-fixed effects. 
7
 We also applied the LSDVC estimator from Bruno (2005) which is especially designed for dynamic 
unbalanced panel data models, but our main results remain unchanged and are available upon request. 
8
 Due to the possible problem of too many instruments we restrict the maximum number of lags used as 
instruments at a maximum of three. 
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of the over-identifying restrictions at conventional levels. While there is evidence of first 
order serial correlation in the residuals, the AR(2) test statistic reveals absence of second 
order serial correlation in the first differenced errors. Our GMM estimates therefore use 
variables lagged by two or more periods as instruments. The Hausman tests indicate that 
coefficient estimates via fixed effects are not significantly different from GMM-DIFF 
estimates. 
Four results stand out. First, lagged investments per capital stock have a positive effect 
on investment activity in a country’s electricity market in the current year. Therefore, 
investments in the electricity sector are characterized by path dependency, presumably 
because adjustment costs are large in high sunk costs industries. This is also underlined by 
negative resp. positive error correction coefficients 1ν resp. 2ν , implying adjustment to a new 
desired capital stock is gradual. These results are consistent with the findings of Alesina et al. 
(2005) for seven regulated sectors in OECD countries and Friederiszick et al. (2008), and 
Grajek and Röller (2009) for the telecom sector. 
Second, we estimate a significant trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. 
Table 3b indicates that the short and long-run effects of prices on investments with GMM-
Diff are positive and significant. In the long run, an increase in prices by 10% increases the 
investment ratio by 5.7% (see GMM-Diff without ECM). This indicates that higher prices, 
while inducing static or allocative inefficiencies, increase the rents that can be earned from 
investments and trigger more investments, which presumably increase dynamic efficiency. 
Note that all our regressions include country and year effects controlling for unobserved 
country (such as cost variations across countries) and business cycle effects. Thus, the time 
series variation in prices within countries most likely captures variations in the Lerner indexes 
(mark-ups) over time, and thus rents to be earned from investments. 
Third, ownership unbundling affects investment spending significantly negatively. 
Again looking at Table 3b, both short-run and long-run negative effects are sizeable and 
significant. Remembering the theoretical arguments from above, the negative double 
marginalization, coordination failure and non-internalization of spillover effects appear to 
outweigh any positive competitive effects. The second measure of direct incumbent 
regulation, third party access, also appears to reduce investments in the electricity sector, but 
less significantly. In contrast, stricter market based regulation appears to be beneficial to 
investments via spurring competition in the market. The presence of a liberalized wholesale 
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market significantly increases investment spending in the GMM-Diff as well as fixed effects 
estimations without ECM. Although the sign estimates point to the same conclusion, MCT 
effects are not significant. Our results imply that increasing competition via market based 
instruments generally appear to increase also investments (and not only competition), 
consistent with the electricity industry still being located to the left of the maximum of the 
relation between competition and innovation (and investments), see Aghion et al. (2005). 
However, increasing competition via forcing the incumbent to provide cost based access or 
via ownership unbundling mainly entails negative effects on investments.9 
 Finally, most estimates on public ownership lead us to conclude that it is detrimental to 
investments, although the GMM-DIFF with ECM estimates indicate positive but insignificant 
effects. The X-inefficiency following from public ownership and control appears to outweigh any 
positive objective effects on investments. 
6. Robustness 
6.1. Different Counterfactuals 
 When analyzing the effects of ownership unbundling (or the other regulatory 
variables), one may criticize our approach in the foregoing section by including all countries 
in the regression, i.e. also those countries that already had OU before the start of the 
estimation period. Thus, the control group may be somewhat contaminated, since the 
estimates of the effects of the introduction of OU are relative to a mixture of countries before 
the introduction of OU, countries that never introduced OU, and countries that already had 
introduced OU before the start of the sample period. Table 4 sample-selects only those 
countries that switched from legal unbundling to ownership unbundling (CZ, DK, ITA, NOR, 
POL, POR, SK, SP, UK) during our estimation period (1998-2007), as well as those countries 
that did not introduce OU until the end of the sample period (AT, BE, FR, GER, and HU). 
Thus, the estimates of the effects of OU allow a before/after introduction of OU comparison 
relative to non-switching countries, i.e. a difference-in-difference comparison. 
The table presents the short and long-run effects of the main variables of interest. All 
our results hold up, some are even more significant. Higher prices lead to higher investments, 
ownership unbundling and forced third party access decrease investment incentives, however, 
market based opening (LWM and MCT) increase investments. The effects of public 
ownership are more on the negative side. 
                                                 
9
 Note that this does not preclude positive static effects of these measures. 
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6.2. Granger Testing and Reverse Causality 
While we have attempted to effectively use the data’s panel structure (by controlling 
for fixed country and time specific effects and lagging our independent variables) in order to 
generate sound causal inferences, the reciprocal causation problem may still be evident in our 
econometric estimations. Namely, it could be that high investments in a country’s electricity 
sector induce firms to set lower prices, since capacity is higher. It could also be that the 
regulatory variables are partly caused by high investments, e.g. the regulatory authority may 
be more confident to switch to ownership unbundling or stricter third party access if 
investments are high anyway. Causality would then also run from investments to our variables 
of interest. Accordingly, we test for causality amongst investments, prices, regulatory and 
ownership variables. 
In testing for causality, we apply standard Granger causality tests Granger (1969). 
Namely, we use a standard joint test (e.g. 2χ -test) of exclusion restrictions to determine 
whether lagged X has significant linear predictive power regarding current Y. The null 
hypothesis that X does not strictly Granger cause Y is rejected if the coefficients on the 
lagged variables of X are jointly/significantly different from zero. Bidirectional causality (or, 
feedback) exists if Granger causality runs in both directions. In particular, we will consider 
two lags in order to test Granger causality. Since we must include lagged dependent variables 
in these Granger tests, estimation with OLS would be inconsistent in the presence of 
unobserved country-fixed effects. Therefore, we estimate our equations again with GMM.  
Table 5 presents our estimation results for these tests of strict Granger causality from 
X to Y. The table presents the p-values for the Granger- 2 (2)χ  tests. While prices 
significantly help predict investments in the subsequent two years, investments are also 
significant predictors for prices. Thus, we cannot exclude partial bi-directiobnal causality 
between prices and investments. The same conclusions apply to MCT and PO. 
 Table 6 reports results on dynamic investment equations treating prices as endogenous 
(column 1), prices, MCT and PO as endogenous (column 2), and all our variables of interest 
as endogenous (column 3). We use lagged values of these variables as instruments. All our 
main results hold up, some become even clearer and more significant. Sargan tests as well as 





 Estimating dynamic panel regression models for 16 European countries over the 
period 1998-2007, we test for the interrelations between investments, prices and regulation in 
a regulated network industry, the electricity industry. We find evidence for the presence of 
both kinds of trade-offs, the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency, and the trade-off 
between vertical synergies and competition. 
We come to a rather negative conclusion what concerns the dynamic effects of 
ownership unbundling of the transmission grid. Unbundling of ownership of the generation 
from the grid stages reduces the investment rate by about five percentage points. We also 
estimate an investment reducing effect of forced third party access to the transmission grid. 
Higher electricity end-user prices induce higher investments in the overall sector. 
 However, we do not argue that competition introduced via regulation per se reduces 
investments, but that the way competition is introduced has important consequences. Giving 
entrants directly access to the incumbent’s network via cost based access charges or owner 
unbundling the incumbent’s grid from other stages of the supply chain, introduce vertical 
diseconomies, non-internalization of network effects and coordination failures, such that the 
net effect on investments is negative, at least in electricity markets. Introducing competition 
via market based measures – such as establishing a wholesale market for electricity or 
abolishing minimum consumption thresholds for switching to alternative suppliers - increases 
investment spending. These measures increase competition and investment spending without 
unduly destroying the incentives to invest. 
 Theory indicates that there are inherent trade-offs in high sunk costs network 
industries. There is a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency, and there is a trade-off 
between vertical synergies and competition. Higher prices induce static inefficiencies, but 
they induce firms to invest. Ownership unbundling prohibits discrimination among firms and 
may ameliorate allocative efficiency, but it destroys incentives to invest. Not surprisingly, we 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable description Source 
Investments, 
I 
Gross investments in tangible goods in the overall 
electricity industry (i.e. investments in generation, 




Since capital stock data is not directly available from the 
data base, we derive it indirectly from investments using 
the perpetual-inventory method 
Eurostat 
Final consumer prices, 
P 
Electricity end-user prices for households in USD per 
kWh. Prices are purchasing power parity corrected and 





Ownership unbundling of the transmission grid (0 = no 
OU, 1 = OU) 
EU documents 
Third party access, 
TPA 
Third party access to the electricity transmission grid (0 








Existence of a liberalized wholesale market for 









Minimum consumption threshold for consumers to be 
allowed to choose their electricity supplier (0 = no 
choice , 1 =  more than 1000 gigawatts (GW), 2 = 
between 500 and 1000 GW, 3 = between 250 and 500 







Ownership structure of the largest companies in the 
generation, transmission, distribution and supply 
segments of the electricity industry (0 = private, 1 = 







Per-capita consumption of electricity OECD 
Long-term interest 
rate, R 












 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
AT 0.0405 0.0269 0.0526 0.1099 0.1000 0.1300 
BE 0.0650 0.0574 0.0712 0.1300 0.1290 0.1310 
CZ 0.0380 0.0283 0.0480 0.1334 0.0830 0.1750 
DK 0.0634 0.0321 0.1261 0.0801 0.0600 0.1010 
FIN 0.0437 0.0190 0.0712 0.0705 0.0630 0.0810 
FR 0.1004 0.0787 0.1221 0.0948 0.0920 0.1000 
GER 0.0391 0.0353 0.0457 0.1456 0.1190 0.1880 
HU 0.0639 0.0545 0.0704 0.1582 0.1060 0.2140 
ITA 0.0662 0.0487 0.0872 0.1395 0.1250 0.1580 
NOR 0.1150 0.0833 0.1541 0.0520 0.0370 0.0780 
POL 0.0447 0.0369 0.0526 0.1461 0.1200 0.1690 
POR 0.0522 0.0225 0.0897 0.1960 0.1810 0.2200 
SK 0.0385 0.0166 0.0530 0.1713 0.0680 0.2280 
SP 0.4253 0.2114 0.6916 0.1429 0.1320 0.1780 
SWE 0.0530 0.0376 0.0786 0.0505 0.0480 0.0530 
UK 0.0937 0.0778 0.1148 0.1206 0.1060 0.1610 
ALL 0.0885 0.0166 0.6916 0.1249 0.0370 0.2280 
 























 Since Since Since Since Since Since Since Since Since Since 
AT No 1999  2002 2001    1975  
BE No 2000  No 2007  1975    
CZ 2005 2000  2000 2006    2004 1975 
DK 2005 1999  1996 2002    1975  
FIN 1997 1995  1996 1997   1999 1975  
FR No 2000  2002 2007    2006 1975 
GER No 2006 1990 2000 1998 1998  1975   
HU No* 2002  2003 2007   1996  1975 
ITA 2004 1999  2004 2007**   2005 2000 1975 
NOR 2002 1991  1991 1991   2007 1975  
POL 2007 2000  No 2007    1999 1975 
POR 2003 2000  2002 2002   1999 1989 1975 
SK 2006 1999  No 2007    2004 1975 
SP 2002 1999 1994 1999 2002   1975 1997  
SWE 1996 1996 1991 1996 1996     1975 
UK 2000 1996 1992 1990 1998 1995   1990 1975 
* OU from 2004 until 2005 in Hungary. 
**Between 2002 and 2003 no MCT in Italy, from 2004 until 2006 the threshold was one gigawatt. 
TPA: Before regulated or negotiated TPA has been introduced in a country, there was always no TPA. 




Table 3a: Determinants of investments 
Dependent  FE FE GMM-DIFF GMM-DIFF 
Variable: 
/ ECM Without ECM ECM Without ECM 





  (0.0745) (0.0706) 
  0.0159 0.2000 -0.1937* -0.1265 
 
(0.0713) (0.1377) (0.1177) (0.1232) 
  0.0215 0.2058 0.3134** 0.5349** 
 
(0.0823) (0.1696) (0.1388) (0.2079) 
 0.0041 -0.0435 0.0154 -0.0125 
 
(0.0227) (0.0456) (0.0228) (0.0266) 
 -0.0232 -0.0701
***
 -0.0552** -0.0552*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.0158) (0.0217) (0.0210) 
 0.0062 -0.0160 -0.0162 -0.0276 
 
(0.0125) (0.0150) (0.0171) (0.0208) 




(0.0130) (0.0313) (0.0205) (0.0250) 
 0.0170 0.0811
*
 0.0359 0.0734** 
 
(0.0158) (0.0450) (0.0238) (0.0324) 
 -0.0179 -0.0111 -0.0165 0.0028 
 
(0.0161) (0.0252) (0.0203) (0.0149) 
 -0.0004 0.0209
*
 0.0273 0.0354* 
 
(0.0055) (0.0117) (0.0166) (0.0201) 
 -0.0038 -0.0138
*
 -0.0147* -0.0235*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0068) (0.0076) (0.0087) 
 -0.0295
**
 -0.0340* -0.0402** -0.0540*** 
 
(0.0106) (0.0184) (0.0156) (0.0174) 
 0.0058 -0.0592
*
 0.0800* 0.0232 
 
(0.0146) (0.0332) (0.0410) (0.0221) 
 ∆  0.1409 0.4717 0.9507*** 0.7235*** 
 
(0.3709) (0.2812) (0.3559) (0.2761) 
 ∆  0.0909 0.1363 0.5476 -0.1278 
 
(0.2294) (0.5784) (0.4112) (0.5241) 
Log ! -0.0172 0.0792 0.1865 0.0945 
 
(0.0701) (0.1304) (0.1436) (0.1423) 
Log ! 0.0707 0.0985 0.0870 0.0266 
 
(0.0593) (0.0837) (0.0621) (0.0420) 
  -0.1841
***
  -0.2072***  
 
(0.0168)  (0.0406)  
  0.1038  1.1149***  
 (0.1647)  (0.4134)  
AR(1) p-value    0.0693 0.0676 
AR(2) p-value    0.1546 0.0969 
Sargan p-value    0.3061 0.1508 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of instruments    55 53 
Observations 75 79 67 67 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Hausman Tests (Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic): FE ECM vs. GMM-Diff ECM: p = 






Tab 3b: Short and long-term effects 
 FE FE GMM-DIFF GMM-DIFF 
 ECM Without ECM ECM Without ECM 
Short log P 0.0373 0.4057 (p=0.121) 0.1196* 0.4084** 
Long log P   0.1461* 0.5716*** 
Short OU  -0.0191 (p=0.126) -0.1135* -0.0398** -0.0676** 
Long OU   -0.0486** -0.0946*** 
Short TPA 0.0072 -0.0254 -0.0511* -0.0412 
Long TPA   -0.0624* -0.0576 
Short LWM -0.0008 0.0700* 0.0193 0.0761*** 
Long LWM   0.0236 0.1066*** 
Short MCT -0.0041 0.0071 0.0125 0.0118 
Long MCT   0.0153 0.0166 
Short PO  -0.0237* -0.0931** 0.0398 -0.0308* 
Long PO   0.0486 -0.0431 
Short-run coefficient "# + #$) for prices; analogous for the other coefficients and variables. 
Long-run coefficient (# + #$) / (1 −%) for prices; analogous for the other coefficients and variables.  
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Tab 4: Robustness: switching countries and never switched countries are 
considered 
 FE FE GMM-DIFF GMM-DIFF 
 ECM Without ECM ECM Without ECM 
Short log P 0.0133 0.4104 0.0944 0.3236* 
Long log P   0.1132 0.4418** 
Short OU  -0.0150 -0.1026* -0.0101 -0.0642** 
Long OU   -0.0122 -0.0876** 
Short TPA 0.0175 -0.0000 -0.0516* -0.0317 
Long TPA   -0.0619* -0.0432 
Short LWM 0.0039 0.0851** 0.0279 0.0967*** 
Long LWM   0.0335 0.1320*** 
Short MCT -0.0052 0.0095 0.0165* 0.0179 
Long MCT   0.0198* 0.0244 
Short PO  -0.0210 -0.0739* 0.0270 -0.0245 
Long PO   0.0325 -0.0334 
AR(1) p-value    0.0677 0.0757 
AR(2) p-value    0.6301 0.0986 
Sargan p-value    0.4744 0.3694 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of instruments    52 50 
Observations 61 63 55 55 
Short-run coefficient "# + #$) for prices; analogous for the other coefficients and variables. 
Long-run coefficient (# + #$) / (1 −%) for prices; analogous for the other coefficients and variables.  
*




Tab 5: Granger causality tests 
GMM-Diff p-value Ho: "& + &=0) Answer 
P causes I ? 0.004 rejected Yes 
I causes P ? 0.037 rejected Yes 
OU causes I ? 0.004 rejected Yes 
I causes OU ? 0.548 Not rejected No 
TPA causes I ? 0.584 Not rejected No 
I causes TPA ? 0.942 Not rejected No 
LWM causes I ? 0.000 rejected Yes 
I causes LWM ? 0.474   Not rejected No 
MCT causes I ? 0.243 Not rejected No 
I causes MCT ? 0.103 rejected Yes 
PO causes I ? 0.002 rejected Yes 
I causes PO ? 0.007 rejected Yes 
"# + #$) for prices; analogous for the other coefficients and variables. 
 
Tab 5: Long and short-term results taking account of (possible) endogeneity 
 GMM-DIFF GMM-DIFF GMM-DIFF 
 Without ECM Without ECM Without ECM 
 P end. P, MCT and PO end. P and all reg. var. end. 
Short log P 0.3637* 0.2882* 0.3422** 
Long log P 0.5097* 0.4071** 0.4866** 
Short OU  -0.0768** -0.0765** -0.0662** 
Long OU -0.1076*** -0.1081*** -0.0941*** 
Short TPA -0.0563 -0.0571 -0.0590 
Long TPA -0.0790 -0.0807 -0.0839 
Short LWM 0.0725** 0.0770** 0.0656** 
Long LWM 0.1016** 0.1087*** 0.0933** 
Short MCT 0.0161 0.0161 0.0167 
Long MCT 0.0226 0.0228 0.0237 
Short PO  -0.0313* -0.0425* -0.0301 
Long PO -0.0439 -0.0601* -0.0428 
AR(1) p-value  0.0697 0.0674 0.0763 
AR(2) p-value  0.1073 0.1105 0.1410 
Sargan p-value  0.2823 0.3877 0.6384 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of instruments  58 60 67 
Observations 67 67 67 
Short-run coefficient "# + #$) for prices; analogous for the other coefficients and variables. 
Long-run coefficient (# + #$) / (1 −%) for prices; analogous for the other coefficients and variables.  
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
